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I. Introduction and Orientation 
This chapter appears in a collection devoted to the nature of humanity, the nature of intelligence, 
the ethical and social challenges posed by emerging technologies, and visions of what the future may 
hold. In this chapter, we give an overview of key technologies dominating our present time, with a focus 
on Artificial Intelligence (AI), a term we will chiefly apply toward algorithms. It is illuminating to explore 
the difficulties in defining the terms “technology” and “artificial intelligence” before we move on to 
discussing what we observe in the present day, how these situations arose, and our concerns for the 
near future.  
We find it most helpful to consider technology and AI in terms of ​how​ they occur rather than what 
they ​are​. Rather than discuss technological artifacts ​per se​, purely in technical terms as one might find in 
a trade magazine or textbook, it is primarily the ​interaction​ between humans and the artifacts of 
technology that is responsible for the widespread interest in this topic. Given the entanglement 
between humans and technology implied in this interaction, our approach fits in the general 
philosophical traditions of “instrumentalism” and the subview of phenomenology (Ihde 1993) as well as 
the network processes ​connecting​ humans to each other and to machines (Latour 2007).  This 
entanglement becomes explicit in modern AI applications that both influence our views of the world 
(Pasquinelli and Joler 2020) and are trained on data about ourselves. 
One of the salient features of successful technologies is ironically their tendency to become 
non​-salient​, ​that is, to become ​unnoticed​ parts of the “background” of our daily lives. Marshall McLuhan 
articulated this in the 1960s:​ “The effects of technology do not occur at the level of opinions or concepts, 
but alter sense ratios or patterns of perception steadily and without any resistance” ​(McLuhan 1964)​. 
Technologies that were once revolutionary quickly become accepted, then normalized, then deemed 
essential, and finally go unnoticed. This loss of saliency is true of things that are now so far in the background 
that we may not even recognize them as being examples of ​technologies​, things such as language and the 
concept of time ​(Postman 1993)​; and the concept of race ​(Benjamin 2019)​. Similarly, technologies once 
deemed “AI” can become part of the background whereby they are no longer regarded as being AI.  
The tendency for AI to become part of the background is the first of three challenges identified 
previously (Hawley 2019) that one encounters when trying to answer the question of “What is AI?” 
Secondly the scope of the term “AI” can increase as organizations engaging “AI hype” apply the term to 
the use of centuries-old statistical operations. The third challenge is the obscuring challenge of 
anthropomorphism, which is unavoidable and results in various forms of cognitive bias (Bryson and Kime 
2011). To these three challenges, we add a fourth by asserting that on a fundamental level,​ the term 
“AI” denotes a “family resemblance” in the sense of Wittgenstein​ (Wittgenstein 1953) rather than a 
classical category with well-defined limits. This notion of family resemblance is illustrated in the category 
of “game”: some games involve competition among two or more players but not all do, some involve 
the use of special equipment but others do not, etc. (Lakoff 1987). Likewise, some AIs have 
pre-programmed rules written by human experts (e.g., many game-playing AIs and expert systems) but 
others “learn” rules from datasets or from “experience,” most perform human-like tasks yet some tasks 
seem to be beyond the limits of human capabilities such as generating photorealistic fictional human 
faces (Paez 2019) or learning to replicate audio effects (Mitchell and Hawley 2020).  
 ​Some authors approach defining AI by first defining intelligence, such as ​“being able to do the right 
thing at the right time” (Bryson 2012)​, and then placing “artificial” before it.  Although this approach can 
be helpful for many situations, we do not find it providing clarity​ for our consideration of the scope and 
impact of AI systems, as “the right thing” may in many situations be poorly-defined (take for example, 
automated music generation systems) and the concept of time may not always be relevant.  
A limit we will ​not​ place on “AI” is to try to restrict its use to the science fiction of simulating all 
human cognitive faculties -- typically dubbed Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) or “strong AI” -- which 
we regard to be of significance for entertainment and far-future concerns for “AI Safety,” but outside 
the scope of the present and near-future scenarios we will explore in this chapter. In this respect we will 
follow the urging of machine learning (ML) pioneer Andrew Ng, “Let's cut out the AGI nonsense and 
spend more time on the urgent problems: ​Job loss/stagnant wages, undermining democracy, 
discrimination/bias, wealth inequality” ​(Ng 2018)​. 
For our present purpose, we will identify “AI” with the use of ​algorithms​ and their application to 
information technology (primarily communications and information retrieval), ​and how through the 
internet they have transformed and disrupted public and personal life in ways largely unforeseen in the 
20th century. What follows are observations of these disruptions. 
 
II. What We Observe Today 
Algorithms have become so ubiquitous that it is hard to imagine life without them. Consider every 
time you pick up your phone to text someone. Before you can type the third letter, an algorithm is 
offering multiple possibilities of words you could write. These are not general suggestions collected from 
a static table but include names and places relevant to your individual context. The recommendations 
are generated a process of ML that takes into account what you have typed in the past along with 
statistical calculations based on what others have typed in that language. All of this is hidden from view 
making algorithms look and feel not like the complex mathematical calculations that they are but 
nothing short of magic. Today, the proverbial “man behind the curtain” is not human but countless lines 
of binary code making decisions in split seconds that together guide and shape the fate of the 
Anthropocene.​1 
At the time of this writing, around 5 billion people in the world have mobile devices (Silver 2019) 
and 3.5 billion of them are smartphones (Turner 2018). It is no longer a luxury of the developed world 
but part of the global reality. The pervasiveness of phones as part of the human experience opens up a 
wide array of possibilities never imagined before in history. One could argue that these digital devices 
are fast becoming extensions of our own bodies. Add to that the fact that the majority of these phones 
1 “Anthropocene” refers to the current geological period we live in where human activity is the dominant 
factor on the climate and the environment.  
are linked to the Internet and we now have the blueprint for what theologian and scientist Teilhard de 
Chardin described as a Noosphere: an interconnected cloud of human knowledge and experience 
(Teilhard de Chardin 2002).  
Embedded at the center of this ecosystem of humans and devices is the regulating presence of 
algorithms. These sets of instructions powered by mathematical equations bring order from the chaos of 
the World Wide Web. Consider, for example, the role that AI plays in social media platforms such as 
Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. With millions of users posting content by the minute, creating a 
compelling experience for the billions of people that visit the platforms daily is the task of a complex 
web of algorithms regulating the relevance of each post to each user. They craft the feed based on the 
users’ past expressed preferences through clicks and scrolling speed, popularity of the post among other 
users, and the commercial interests of companies paying to advertise on the platform.​2​ The result is an 
individualized experience for each user so unique that no two users see the same content even if they 
visit the platform at the same time. Social media powered by algorithms enables each human to live 
their own micro-reality. 
Another major gateway to the Internet is the search engine. That is by far how users discover new 
sites on the web. Google, the undisputed leader in this field, uses a proprietary ever-changing algorithm 
that ranks sites based on a number of factors which include keywords, links pointing to it, content 
relevance, and domain name (Page et al. 1999). The result is surprisingly effective, allowing the searcher 
to find what they need in the first few links listed. Its pervasive use has made the company name a 
colloquial verb in English. When you don’t know something, you “google it.” In effect, the search engine, 
which is now available in billions of phones, is serving as an auxiliary brain (Clark and Chalmers 1998) for 
humanity allowing light-speed access to information. 
The combination of algorithms and hand-held devices are disrupting and reshaping foundational 
industries such as retail, housing, and transportation. Uber and Lyft have upended the market for rides 
long dominated by inadequate public transportation systems and inefficient taxi networks. Yet, their 
influence will not stop there. App-enabled services are now looking to re-shape the car industry by 
spearheading a push towards autonomous vehicles. Since AlexNet proved that computers could 
accurately recognize images in late 2012, this opened the door for fully functioning automated 
transportation (Gershgorn 2017). Computer vision may well replace human vision behind the wheel, 
completely re-shaping the relationship between people and automobiles. Ride offering companies 
imagine a world where car ownership is optional and human movement is fully enabled by autonomous 
vehicles. 
Apps-enabled services are not limited to transporting people but have also branched out into things. 
It was algorithmic enabled services that allowed Amazon to reorient the retail industry away from big 
box stores into hand-held devices. When governments imposed lockdowns because of COVID, 
app-enabled services saved the restaurant industry through delivery services like Dash and Uber Eats. 
They are now moving fast into the housing industry as they disrupt real estate and rent markets. Zillow 
and Trulia now offer detailed information on houses for sale that was previously only available to real 
2 The Netflix documentary ​The Social Dilemma ​paints a vivid picture of this process by having one actor playing 
three different algorithms. The three versions of the actor have a conversation with each other where they 
consider the pros and cons of what to show the user.  
estate agents. The next step beyond that is found in Open Door which removes human agents from the 
house selling transaction, directly buying from and selling to individuals.  
App-enabled disruption has not been free of criticism. Government and consumer protection groups 
are halting their advance of these services to better understand their destructive side-effects. In 2018, 
the city of Seattle banned rent-bidding apps (Pyzyk 2018) like Rentberry and Bidwell so their impact on 
housing affordability in the city could be assessed. City council members worried that these services 
were making an already property supply-challenged city even more expensive to live in. It is yet to be 
seen whether the city’s continued ban will encourage other localities to do the same. Yet, the struggle in 
the Emerald City is emblematic of more battles to come as society absorbs the disorienting impacts of 
algorithmic businesses.  
Even as legal challenges emerge in these unprecedented business scenarios, the judicial system 
itself is undergoing disruption due to algorithms. ML models are now used to predict and manage risk, 
such as anticipating which defendants are less likely to show up in court or are most likely to re-offend. 
These models are highly controversial (Awere 2020) because they are built on past data and therefore 
tend to replicate existing conditions, such as bias against particular social groups. The models are blind 
to ideas of justice and fairness, so they can only learn based on the data provided. Furthermore, these 
algorithms will often produce false positives and other statistical errors which can have life-and-death 
consequences for defendants. Hence, the thinktank Partnership on AI recommends using such models 
primarily to speed up the release process of current inmates as opposed to lengthening sentences 
(Partnership on AI 2019).  
Algorithms are fast becoming an integral part of our political systems. In 2018, the world learned 
about how Cambridge Analytica illegally acquired the personal data of 50 million Americans on 
Facebook through an add-on app in order to serve micro-targeted political ads in the 2016 election 
(Ashworth and Gillespie 2018). While the story raised an uproar about personal data safety, the practice 
of using voter data for political advertising continues. Rich datasets allow campaigns to customize their 
message to ever smaller voter groups to get out the vote. A recent ​NYU Ad Observatory​ report 
(Ryan-Mosley 2020), shows that both the Biden and the Trump campaign in 2020 were harvesting data 
from Facebook and other platforms to target potential voters and donors. Algorithmic political targeting 
is here to stay.  
Furthermore, there is evidence that Russian bots​3​ sowed misinformation to further polarize the 
American electorate. Roughly 20% of all tweets about the 2016 US presidential election were produced 
by bots (Schneier 2020). On the other hand, these same ML models are now being deployed to curb 
corruption in places like Mexico and Ukraine (Aarvik 2019). While the practice is still in its infancy, this 
application is a promising tool in the battle for a more transparent future. AI is well-suited to detecting 
anomalies too subtle for human monitoring to catch.  
Education is also undergoing disruption through the introduction of algorithms geared toward the 
customization of the learning experience. While many schools still offer a one-size-fits-all instruction, 
app-enabled education allows students to progress at their own pace. Math apps can track the child’s 
learning in real-time, adjusting the next question to reinforce a concept missed or advance to new 
3 Bots are automated text generating algorithms that can be trained to send tweets, carry on text interaction 
with customers and even provide psychological advice.  
material (Ashbach 2013). This is empowering large universities to ensure struggling students do not fall 
through the cracks. Georgia State University has successfully implemented a predictive model to identify 
students with high likelihood of drop out (Hefling 2019). The models allow administrators to reach out 
to these students early on with resources and guidance to help them persevere in their academic 
journey.  
Not even romance is immune to the algorithmic revolution! Match-making algorithms seek to pair 
people based on elaborate questionnaires and a growing database of what has worked in the past. 
Although such systems have been around for decades (Finkel 2012), it is notable how prevalent they 
have become​.​ In an age where a staggering 40% of marriages start online (Kopf 2019), algorithms are 
playing a crucial part in deciding who gets to meet whom. This is an unprecedented change in human 
society, one which the effects we are yet to fully comprehend. In a recent Pew survey (Perez 2020), 
more than half of responders believe that relationships online were just as successful as those started 
through traditional means. Yet, when asked whether they have improved the dating scene, the majority 
was ambivalent. The jury is still out but algorithmic matchmaking will not go away anytime soon.  
Finally, algorithms are also changing how we wage war. The conflicts of the future will not be fought 
only with soldiers and tanks but also with hackers and bots.​4​ ​A key concern at the moment is regarding 
autonomous weapons: systems that can pursue a target without human intervention. This would allow a 
national army to engage in combat without risking human lives. As enticing as this may sound, this 
scenario would also lower the threshold for war, having an adverse effect on geopolitical stability. While 
the technology is still a few years out, scientists and AI developers from the Future of Life Institute have 
called for a ban on such weapons (Future of Life Institute 2015). They fear that these technologies could 
easily be scaled and used by non-state actors such as terrorists and criminals. Likewise, the NGO 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots​ also seeks to create global consensus around restricting the development 
of these weapons (The Campaign To Stop Killer Robots). It remains to be seen whether political leaders 
will heed to these grave calls or instead opt for engaging in a dangerous arms race.  
 
III. How Did We Get Here? 
Tracing the development of our modern state of dependence on technology and AI could arguably 
extend back for millennia given the inventive drive of the human species. Yet the uniqueness of our 
present moment can be seen to emerge from a comparatively recent set of starting points. These come 
into focus when we view the observations of the preceding section as the confluence of three historical 
trends or “streams”:​ automation, optimization, ​and ​human sciences​.  
 
III.1. The Stream of Automation  
Automation can be regarded as the endpoint of ​mechanization​, the alleviation or replacement of 
human (skilled) labor via the use of machines. Typified by the power loom of the early Industrial 
Revolution which served both to meet and to increase demand for high-quality textiles, this new 
automation technology resulted in reduced wages and unemployment for skilled (human) weavers. It 
also opened up opportunities for low-skill human employment, including a rise in child labor that was 
4 For an in-depth investigative analysis of Russian cyber hackers, we recommend Andy Greenberg’s ​Sandworm: 
A New Era of Cyberwar and the Hunt for the Kremlin's Most Dangerous Hackers.  
often exploitive (Smelser 2011). Comparisons between the Industrial Revolution and modern AI 
deployment are common (e.g., Morrisse 2017), with AI often being dubbed “The Fourth Industrial 
Revolution” (e.g., Crameri 2018). 
Automation offers perceived advantages to employers over human labor, which include: 
● continuous​ ​operation​: being able to operate day and night, and without breaks 
● speed​: being able to work faster than humans 
● consistency​ of products: a requirement for supply chains 
○ This also implies the ability to easily ​scale​: new “workers” need not be trained, rather 
new machines can be deployed. 
● the obviation of “human resources” considerations such as paying benefits, dealing with injury 
or sickness, or having the “workers” organize as labor unions. 
While these features of automation have been traditionally viewed in light of factory manufacturing 
processes, all of these features are directly mirrored in modern AI-based approaches to a host of 
applications, including online sales, criminal justice, surveillance, software-as-a-service, automated 
content moderation, and countless others. Some implications of automation, such as the ability to scale, 
are now such standard tech industry parlance as to be termed “key buzzwords” (Bridgwater 2020). One 
major proponent of automation was Henry Ford, whose introduction of the assembly line allowed the 
scale of automotive production to outstrip all competitors at the time. In addition to introducing means 
to automate manufacturing processes, Ford strived to maximize their efficiency, using ideas inspired by 
(and later conducted in consultation with) Frederick Taylor, a major figure in what we are calling the 
Stream of Optimization.  
 
III.2. The Stream of Optimization 
We use the term “optimization” in the sense of maximizing rewards and/or minimizing risks, and 
include attempts to increase efficiency. It can refer to merely the mathematical or engineering 
operations itself, or, when applied to increasing scopes of life the drive to optimize can be regarded as 
an ideology, what Jacques Ellul referred to as “Technique” (Ellul 1964), resulting in the “tyranny of a 
technical order,” a world in which technology exists for its own sake and everything else is secondary to 
the ultimate goal of efficiency.  Driven to its logical conclusion, this drive to optimize efficiency yields 
outcomes inimical to human flourishing (Burdett 2020). Both the ideological aspects of optimization and 
their repercussions in the world of business and society can be viewed in terms of the legacy of 
Frederick W. Taylor, the mechanical engineer who rose to fame as an efficiency consultant to American 
businesses in the early 20th century (Saval 2014). Taylor’s “scientific management” approach of 
breaking down employee’s work processes into a series of small tasks mirrored the design of Henry 
Ford’s assembly plants and included the monitoring and micro-management of these tasks to improve 
efficiency. Modern employee surveillance systems such as Microsoft’s new Productivity Score feature 
(Hern 2020) are direct descendants of “Taylorism,” with the added feature that in many industries 
human managers of productivity have themselves been replaced by machines (Lecher 2019)​ ​-- thus we 
see another link between optimization and automation. 
While the management and manufacturing processes could be optimized by careful interventions of 
control, there exist events that remain beyond a business’s control, constituting ​risk​. Studies of 
probability had existed since the gambling analyses of Renaissance mathematicians, with the ​actuarial 
science​ use of probability to quantify the risk of death for insurance purposes following shortly 
thereafter. Yet the data to inform such probability estimates were for many years not easily obtainable. 
The harvesting of personal data was greatly advanced by Francis Galton, “the Father of Statistics,” who 
appealed to the Institute of Actuaries urging them to avail themselves of opportunities to acquire data 
on people in order to improve risk assessments (Pearson 1914). At the 1884 World Health Exhibition, 
Galton pioneered a method of creating massive ​datasets​ of people (Johnson et al. 1985) by enticing 
them to participate in activities such as games that revealed details about themselves, even charging 
them money to do so (Cowan 1972). This served as a direct precursor of the data-harvesting “Facebook 
games” (Bogost 2018) of the early 2010s. Galton would go on to apply his datasets and analyses to 
“scientific” methods of law enforcement, such as his fingerprint classification system ​that survives to this 
day ​(Jiang 2009)​, as well as more dubious and discredited physiognomy studies predicting criminality 
that see modern misguided applications via more sophisticated methods such as neural networks ​(Bailey 
2016)​. 
Modern ML systems use statistics gleaned from large datasets created by imitating Galton’s method 
of offering users something “for cheap,” such as the price of their privacy. Google pioneered this with 
“free” utilities such as Gmail and Google Docs. Google provides this functionality in exchange for the 
authors’ license to users’ text when training various ML systems. It is no surprise that two of the most 
successful ML research groups are those run by Google and Facebook, who own more data on citizens 
than Western government-run security organs. It is worth noting the link between statistics and police 
work advocated by Galton offers an appealing option for resource-strained organizations. From 2005 to 
2010, the protagonists of the CBS television show “NUMB3RS” who often made use of statistical 
“predictive policing” methods were portrayed as heroes, finding hostages before time ran out or 
tracking down dangerous serial killers. Since 2010, the narrative around predictive policing has shifted 
dramatically, as it has been demonstrated that such methods reinforce racist patterns of selective 
enforcement (Noble 2018). 
It is in ML that the two streams of automation and optimization merge, ​for machine learning 
consists of casting an automation problem as an optimization problem​. Although Galton combined 
datasets on humans with statistics to recommend policies, he lacked a model of human cognition or the 
nuanced insights into behavior that would emerge in the 20th century. Thus a proper account of the 
trajectory leading to the present state of technology and AI would be incomplete without considering 
contributions from the human sciences.  
 
III.3. The Stream of Human Sciences 
The previous two streams could be regarded as processes of capitalism, but the third stream of AI 
development derives at least as much from purely academic pursuits of scientists having no commercial 
intentions as it does from marketing and advertising executives who later applied the scientists’ work. 
The human sciences of behavioral psychology, cognitive science, and social dynamics have contributed 
significantly to the development, application, and assessment of AI systems. In order to have a machine 
that performs human-like tasks with results that conform with human expectations, borrowing and 
modeling neural architectures from biological brains has, in the past 10 years, demonstrated 
significantly improved gains in model expressiveness and accuracy over symbolic AI approaches.  
Modern neural network systems owe their origins to a series of efforts to better understand and 
model the human brain. The seminal work of McCulloh and Pitts (McCulloch and Pitts 1943) is typically 
invoked for introducing the first artificial neuron that became known as the “perceptron,” yet their work 
was significantly more than that because they applied the ​computational​ paradigms of Alan Turing to 
networks​ of their artificial neurons to describe brain activity.​5​ The cross-pollination between 
neuroscientists and computer scientists has been significant over the ensuing decades, and even as 
formalized efforts toward “Artificial Intelligence” by the likes of Minsky and collaborators (Minsky and 
Papert 1969) sought to do away with the popularity of perceptron models in favor of symbolic reasoning 
for the brain the goal was purely a scientific, not economic one. Along the way, there has been some 
interesting interplay between the development of purely artificial methods that “work” despite their 
lack of biological basis versus methods designed to directly mimic biological systems. One example 
would be the notion of “learning”: It wasn’t until 7 years after the Perceptron model that a mechanism 
for learning was proposed by David Hebb (Hebb 1949), and yet “Hebbian learning,” has proven generally 
much less useful for AI than the optimization method known as “backpropagation” (Schmidhuber 2014), 
despite backpropagation’s lack of biological grounding. This has been likened to the way humans 
developed airplanes that fly with wings inspired by birds and yet the airplanes’ wings do not flap, or how 
submarines “swim” via the use of propellers instead of moving their tails like fish. As neural networks 
have become increasingly ​useful​ for tasks in business, government, etc., the goal of mimicking human 
thought has become increasingly de-emphasized in AI development (Hinton 2014), with the contrast 
between real and artificial becoming starker, namely that a system can perform tasks ​similar​ to how 
humans do without necessarily using processes identical to those of humans.  
Besides the design of neural networks, also important are the behavioral psychology studies of 
“conditioning'' pioneered by Pavlov and later Skinner (Bouton 2020). The notion that neural responses in 
animals, and by extension humans, can be trained by conditioning them on a series of reinforcements 
has had widespread applications in education, which have since been extended to training robots in the 
burgeoning field of “Reinforcement Learning.” Such applications have evolved from early game-playing 
AIs to sophisticated systems for content recommendation, financial trading, and industrial controls 
(Argerich 2020). Yet the most large-scale application of these behavioral science methods has been with 
the (often non-consensual) experimentation on humans via “addictive” apps, noteworthy Facebook, 
who hired behavioral psychologists as consultants for the express purpose of making the app addictive 
in order to sell more advertising. The idea of “nudging” (Tagliabue et al. 2019) or influencing users 
without their noticing has become a familiar part of the repertoire of social media influence strategies.  
The enterprise of influencing large numbers of people owes a great debt to Edward Bernays, whose 
Propaganda​ brought ideas from the behavioral psychology of business marketing into the world of 
politics, and whose strategies and methods have been cited for directly influencing the success of 
populist political movements including the rise of Naziism and the election of Donald Trump (Jones 
2017). A significant passage reads: 
 
5 For a gripping biography of Pitts and his working relationship with McCulloch, see Amanda Gefter’s article, 
“​The Man Who Tried to Redeem the World with Logic​,” ​Nautilus​, Feb. 5, 2015.  
“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses 
is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of 
society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are 
governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, and our ideas suggested, largely by men we 
have never heard of…. It is they who pull the wires that control the public mind.”​ (Bernays 1928, 
p. 10) 
 
The point of including this quote is not to promote conspiracy theory, but rather to contextualize it to 
the power of large-scale social media platforms in use today. As we will see in the following sub-section, 
this enterprise of popular influence, when automated and scaled, and optimized by ML, can be 
employed to serve as an engine of change in world affairs.  
 
III.4 ​The Confluence of the Three Streams 
We now have automated, scaled global information platforms, designed to maximize user 
engagement by exploiting insights gained from the behavioral sciences, optimized by ever-more 
sophisticated models mimicking human cognitive processes, with feedback loops via the data they 
harvest during user engagement, which individualize/personalize the content seen and can be used to 
influence public opinion in ways previously only hoped for. An example of such an application was 
described in Section II, namely the use of Facebook user data by Cambridge Analytica to influence 
elections in Trinidad and Tobago, the USA, and the UK. This was popularized in the Netflix documentary 
“The Great Hack.” Although the documentary’s claims may be exaggerated  in parts as a tale of 
techno-determinism (Lynch et al. 2018), the deliberate use of Facebook as a weapon of (personalized) 
algorithm-driven propaganda serves as a significant techo-cultural milestone. A further ​unintended 
effect of social media platforms on political life is the emergence of “echo chambers” or “filter bubbles” 
(Pariser 2011) created by recommendation algorithms which show users content expressing views they 
are likely to resonate with, with resultant growing polarization in society.  Similar unintended polarizing 
effects were exposed in YouTube’s video recommendation (i.e., user engagement optimization) system 
by former Google Brain engineer Gilliame Chalot, who pointed out the algorithms’ tendency to 
recommend radical or inflammatory content (Nicas 2018), further driving viewers from areas of 
common consensus. This suggests an important question: What other “unintended consequences” are 
likely to emerge as results of automated algorithmic systems designed to optimize users’ data-producing 
behavior? We suspect we are only seeing the beginning of such occurrences; as they are linked to ML 
algorithms' ability to learn from user data, the role of user data will have a dramatic impact on the 
directions such developments will take. We next explore regulatory patterns for user data.  
 
IV. Where Might We Be Headed?  
As AI systems learn primarily from data, our algorithmic future hinges upon the vital question of 
data ownership. Techno-capitalists in Silicon Valley believe data belongs to the organizations that collect 
and store it (Iffergan 2018). Party leaders in China believe data belongs to government entities who can 
then use them to better manage society (Nussipov 2020a). Other thought leaders in Europe and other 
continents want to return data ownership to the individual. They believe an equitable future is most 
likely if we first democratize ownership ensuring privacy and oversight of its use (Nussipov 2020b). The 
next decades will see the competition between these three main models for data play out in the 
geopolitical theater. The future will be a mixture of the three as they are replicated around the globe 
setting the contextual rails upon which algorithms will transform and re-orient societies. In the next 
sessions, we outline them separately looking at their implications for ethics, political systems, 
economies, and the environment.  
 
IV.1 The Techno-Capitalist Dream and the Googlization of the World 
A techno-capitalist scenario will be driven by experimentation and market forces to sort out the 
winners. If the stock market is a good indicator of future performance, the FAAMG (Facebook, Amazon, 
Apple, Microsoft, and Google) group are poised to dominate the business landscape extending into 
diverse industries from transportation to healthcare.​6​ As of 2020, four of these companies have crossed 
the impressive threshold of the trillion dollar mark in valuation (Winck 2020), one has already reached 
double that mark (The Economist 2020). This is an unprecedented time in history where multinational 
companies’ value rivals the GDP of most countries in the world.  
Their growth and influence are not limited to financial means but also capture the imagination of 
billions in the world with their vision of the future. Their utopia rests on the belief that all problems have 
a technological solution. Progress comes through the entrepreneur who creates products people don’t 
even know they need. AI is the means through which this dream is accomplished. If they have their way, 
AI development will come through bold experimentation. In this scenario, AI continues to flourish 
through business enterprises that beat out competition by offering the most compelling products or 
most convenient services for the lowest price. In this scenario, AI is commodified and controlled by the 
winning organizations that best incorporate it into their operations. Consumers benefit from cheaper 
products and better services. Yet, workers see their rights and livelihood increasingly diminished 
through massive inequality as tech companies yield more political power to further their own interests.  
The centralization of income, resources, and jobs around large technological conglomerates creates 
a global elite of highly-skilled workers who can fill the jobs created by the growing companies. Those are 
the techno-skills-haves. Conversely, those unable to join the ranks of multinational tech companies or 
the business ecosystems that sustain them face considerable uncertainty in their job prospects. The 
problem is not that AI replaces human workers but that it irreversibly changes the nature of jobs. It 
ushers in a new economy that cannibalizes the old, creating new opportunities for those with the right 
skills but making employment scarce to those who lack those skills. For the latter group, the gig 
economy becomes the norm where workers have flexibility but little protection or stability. Those are 
the techno-skills-have-nots.  
In this scenario, data is the sole property of the organizations that collect it and the Internet is fully 
funded by data insights that businesses will pay for. Algorithms are optimized for profit with little 
consideration for other goals such as human flourishing or environmental sustainability. Instead, 
technological applications emerge primarily to meet market needs which may or may not align with the 
priorities of a warming planet. In short, this scenario means an abundance of sophisticated gadgets but 
fewer breakthroughs in science and or humanitarian work. It is a world of technological products as 
6 Outside of the US, one could include Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent. Netflix is often included in this list which is 
at times referred to as FANG.  
opposed to solutions to global problems. At its worst, it would lead us to the world portrayed in Pixar 
animated movie ​Wall-E​, where humans are forced to leave a trash-saturated and lifeless earth to find 
another planet.  
  
IV.2 The People’s Republic of Data and the Technocratic State 
The last 40 years have witnessed the meteoric rise of China to the global geopolitical stage. In a few 
decades, the Asian giant went from regional player to world superpower status. Its economy is expected 
to overtake the United States by as early as 2024 (Bucholz 2020). They hope to do so in part by 
establishing global dominance in AI technologies. The turning point for that decision came in March 
2016 when Google DeepMind’s AlphaGo bested Lee Sedol in the game of Go, a match watched live by 
over 280 million Chinese (Schiavenza 2018). In the following year, the Chinese government released a 
report outlining a strategy to become the leading AI power by 2030 (Webster et al. 2017). Chinese 
leadership in this area opens the path for an alternative scenario of the future of AI from the one 
envisioned by Silicon Valley. In this future, the state owns the data and coordinates the private and 
public sectors to implement AI across industries and infrastructure projects. 
What would that look like in practical terms? One sharp contrast is in the area of facial recognition 
and surveillance. In a regime where concepts of privacy are more fluid, surveillance technology becomes 
more effective. In 2018, Chinese police identified and caught a most-wanted criminal via surveillance 
cameras that spotted him from a crowd of 60,000 concert goers (BBC News 2018)! This impressive feat 
is only possible because China already counts on a vast infrastructure of CCTV surveillance cameras. In 
this case, algorithms can search through thousands of faces in a short amount of time allowing law 
enforcement to act quickly. While this method would raise eyebrows in the west, it may be well received 
in the developing world where crime and corruption are a chronic problem 
Another example of how the Chinese data-centralized scenario differs is in the development of a 
social credit system (Persson et al. 2015). This Chinese innovation expands on the idea of a credit score 
to a reputational score that includes additional measures of trustworthiness. The idea is to quantify a 
citizen’s deeds and misdeeds in order to incentivize, through punishment or rewards, preferred social 
behaviors. Punishment can include being denied an airline ticket or barring a child admittance to 
prestigious private schools and rewards can mean shorter lines in hospitals and possibly better 
prospects for landing a job.​7  
A future where this scenario is prevalent would see an increasing centralization of data under 
government entities across the globe. This could yield significant efficiencies and improvements in public 
services such as smart infrastructure, speedier justice systems, and more robust law enforcement. It 
would also see increased behavior modification through reputational systems and other technological 
nudges. Here we see technology as a primary and intentional tool for social engineering and 
accomplishing national goals. On the positive side, we may see improvements in tackling intractable 
social problems, building smart cities, and possibly curbing corruption and waste. Hence, government 
centralized data can unleash algorithmic benefits to a larger share of society. However, it will most likely 
7 Science fiction offers a dystopian view of how social credit can go wrong. British show ​Black Mirror​, Nosedive 
episode, portrays how a woman’s life quickly unravels when she makes a mistake that negatively impacts her social 
credit.  
lead to a decrease in individual freedoms and privacy. At its worst, it can lead to Orwellian state control 
where a totalitarian government regulates every aspect of its citizen’s lives. It would be especially 
detrimental for minorities such as the example of Uighur Muslims in China shows (Mozur 2019). If in the 
first scenario we are at the mercy of profit-seeking organizations, this one places our fate in the 
benevolence of governmental bureaucracies. 
 
IV.3 The Democratization of Data for a Shared Future 
The third alternative seeks to build a world where data is a shared resource managed by an engaged 
civic society. Outlines of this scenario are starting to emerge in the European Union. Its foundations are 
built on user-owned data and transparent algorithms along with vigorous regulation to curb data misuse 
by government or corporations. In this scenario, data belongs to individuals ensuring that the wealth 
mined is shared more broadly across all levels of society.  
The seeds of this vision began with the free software movement in the late 1980s (Free Software 
Foundation 2005). In a time when Microsoft was beginning to build its empire based on commercial 
closed-code, the free software foundation (GNU) ushered in a powerful alternative where programmers 
shared the fruits of their labor ​gratis​. By the late 1990s, the movement would change its name to 
open-source as a way to gain greater adoption in the corporate world where the “free” label often raises 
suspicion (Opensource.org 2018). The consolidation of the Internet as a global agent for connection 
further reinforced the idea that programming knowledge should be a free communal endeavor. In the 
age of big data, this is translating into a movement for open data where large datasets are made 
available to the public for free.​8 
The collaboration is not limited to data but is now expanding into the algorithms where volunteer 
communities are emerging to regulate their use. The city of Amsterdam, for example, recently created a 
registry that lists all the algorithms that the city uses to provide public services. The registry lists the 
algorithms and offers plain explanations of how they work, their potential risks, and biases they may 
have. Citizens can not only get a better understanding of how the city government employs algorithms 
but can also provide feedback. Public registries as these represent an intentional move towards 
human-centered algorithm development and oversight.  
This vision is enshrined in the recently adopted GDPR (European Parliament 2016), namely, the 
European Union regulatory blueprint for the use of personal data. It defines data protection as a 
fundamental right, therefore envisioning data privacy as a human right. In practice, that means that the 
individual has full autonomy to know and decide on what is being done with their information. As such, 
the EU seeks to foster an environment where innovation can still flourish while individual privacy is 
preserved. To date, it is the most robust piece of legislation in the area and in store to be replicated in 
other areas of the world. In January of 2020, California implemented its own version, which while 
echoing some of GDPR’s principles, stopped short of empowering the individual to fully restrict a 
company’s use of their data (Jehl et al. 2018).  
Another facet of this vision is the democratization of tech skills. If the corporate-driven model 
creates an elite of highly skilled workers, open AI seeks to make these skills readily available to the 
8 For examples consult https://data.worldbank.org, https://sparcopen.org/open-data, and the US 
government’s repository for free datasets https://www.data.gov 
masses, especially to under-represented groups such as Latinx, African-Americans, and women. A great 
example is the OpenMined community who seek to teach individuals from all backgrounds how to build 
AI models that also preserve data privacy through encryption and federated learning (OpenMined 2019). 
Furthermore, a cottage industry of coding academies that offer bootcamps and micro-degrees are 
popping up all over the world providing more affordable options for those seeking to upskill for tech 
jobs. Early reports, however, do not show an expansion in diversity as their student composition still 
mirrors the ethnic and gender underrepresentation in the industry (Eggleston, 2017). With that said, 
several non-profit initiatives are trying to change this trend by encouraging adolescents and young 
adults from under-represented groups to study STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) 
subjects (Walsh 2020).  
The success of this vision could fundamentally change how technology is developed and used in the 
world. At its best, a diverse tech workforce along with data and algorithms monitored by civic society 
should yield a more human-centric technology. Furthermore, global volunteer alliances can engage in 
tackling difficult global problems through cooperation and knowledge sharing. Certainly, industry and 
government would still play a role as non-profit NGOs are limited in their reach and face challenges in 
becoming sustainable over the long haul. At its worst, such open environments could promote digital 
anarchy where malicious actors use technology for their own gain. In the absence of greater 
government control and industry standards, groups like Anonymous could multiply and wreak havoc in 
economies all over the globe where vigilante groups enact many forms of mob justice (Beran 2020). In 
this scenario, we are at the mercy of our global collective to regulate our most insidious impulses.  
 
V. Summary 
Technology and Artificial Intelligence, both today and in the near future, are dominated by 
automated algorithms that combine optimization with models based on the human brain to learn, 
predict, and even influence the large-scale behavior of human users. Such applications can be 
understood to be outgrowths of historical trends in industry and academia, yet have far-reaching and 
even unintended consequences for social and political life around the world. Countries in different parts 
of the world take different regulatory views for the role and protection of user data, and this will in turn 
determine the course of development for technology and AI in the near future.  
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